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Abstract
How do wage and other nancial benets a¤ect the set of candidates for political o¢ ce? In this
theoretical paper, we answer the question by studying self-selection into politics of individuals with
heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous motivations. Our predictions are in line with the e¢ ciency
wage results proposed by the extant literature when a benchmark model with skills as the sole
relevant characteristic of individuals is considered. Welfare is increasing in the politicianswage
since the best, i.e., high-skilled, individuals are attracted to politics only if their remuneration
covers their high opportunity costs. Our ndings are remarkably di¤erent when motivation is also
taken into account. Welfare is not likely to be maximized when the politicianswage is relatively
high, for high-skilled individuals with market-oriented rather than public-spirited motivation are
attracted. Finally, we provide an overview of the labor market of politicians in Europe and suggest
that the Italian Parliament might be representative of our ine¢ ciency wage mechanism, which we
call moneycracy.
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Introduction
It is widely recognized that good government is a crucial prerequisite for economies to ourish. In
turn, the e¤ectiveness of policy-making depends on the quality of the elected o¢ cials, i.e., on their
ability to maximize welfare by making decisions on behalf of the citizens. Since politicians are chosen
within the pool of those willing to serve, nding a convincing answer to the following question is a
relevant economic issue: how do wage and other nancial benets a¤ect political self-selection?
Besley (2005) argues that political selection is important because the control of politicians through
elections may be limited. Interestingly, he also observes (p. 44): "Much of the modern literature
on political economy has not only neglected the problem of political selection, it has been positively
hostile to the topic." This is why only recently economists have tackled this issue (see, e.g., Caselli
& Morelli, 2004, and Messner & Polborn, 2004, for theoretical analyses; Ferraz & Finan, 2009, and
Gagliarducci & Nannicini, 2013, for empirical evidence). The above papers generally measure quality
of the political class through one dimension, namely skills. The importance of politicianscompetence
for government decision-making is indeed axiomatic. Accordingly, a common prediction is provided,
which is in line with the adverse selection framework of the e¢ ciency wage theory (see, e.g., Weiss,
1980; and Malcolmson, 1981). Since remuneration is mainly xed in the public sector, whilst markets
reward skills, only low-skilled individuals will run for o¢ ce. As a result, increasing nancial benets
from holding o¢ ce may attract better candidates and enhance policy outcome.
A possible shortcoming of the above analysis is that it deals with politicians without explicitly
taking into account one of the oldest topics discussed by public administration scholars, namely
the motivation (see, e.g., Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). Public service motivation of politicians, or
more generally of public servants, is dened as "an individuals predisposition to respond to motives
grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations" (Perry & Wise, 1990). Put
di¤erently, the working activity of politicians is also driven by something else than material incentives
such as money or career advancements. This notion has recently been brought into economic thinking.
For instance, Besley (2005) argues that motivation of politicians "can be thought of as hard-wired
into preferences rather than being dependent on external reinforcement".
Accordingly, the present theoretical paper extends the existing literature by explicitly including
the role of politiciansmotivation. To be more precise, we examine how the level of politicians
nancial remuneration a¤ects self-selection into politics of individuals with both heterogeneous skills
and heterogeneous motivations.
The relevant issue of work motivation has been dealt with by various strands of the economics
literature. For instance, Handy & Katz (1998) study the selection of intrinsically motivated managers
in the non-prot sector. Heyes (2005) focuses on the nursing labor market. The design of optimal
incentives when agents are intrinsically motivated is instead developed by Besley & Ghatak (2005),
Delfgaauw & Dur (2007), and Stowe (2009).
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In this paper, we introduce a citizen-candidate model where individuals decide whether to run
for o¢ ce. Only one individual is elected randomly and then provides a public good.1 The others
devote themselves to a private activity in the market sector.2 Given our focus on self-selection into
politics rather than on behavior once in o¢ ce, we adopt a static framework based on the comparison
of the individualspayo¤ from one period in o¢ ce against one period in the market. Accordingly, we
disregard the role played by reelection in a¤ecting moral hazard problems (see, e.g., Smart & Sturm,
2004, and Beniers & Dur, 2007).
Motivated, or public-t, individuals are dened as those closely tting with the public sector
environment in terms of value congruence. There are many examples of people whose main work
values and goals are public-oriented, e.g., they aim at serving the interests of a community. This type
of individuals are supposed to be well tted with the public sector because it is the environment where
they are most likely to achieve their work goals (see Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010, for a similar denition
of public service motivated individuals). By contrast, non-motivated, or market-t, individuals have
a good t with the market sector for their main work values are market-oriented, e.g., they enjoy
performing business occupations and/or they engage in the pursuit of high monetary incomes. We
suppose that, for any given level of skills, (i) public-t individuals are (weakly) more e¢ cient than
market-t when providing the public good; (ii) market-t citizens are (weakly) more e¢ cient than
public-t when running the private activity. We also assume that, for any given type of t, high-
skilled individuals are more productive than low-skilled ones in both public and market sectors.
Utilitarian welfare is maximum (minimum) in our framework when an individual with both public
t and high skills (market t and low skills) is in o¢ ce in that she is able to supply the maximum
(minimum) level of public good enjoyed by the whole society.
Theories of person-environment t, broadly dened as the compatibility between an individual
and a work environment that occurs when their characteristics are well matched, have been popular
in management literature since Parsons (1909). The idea that the person-environment t can be a
crucial determinant of work motivation is not new in economics literature. Besides Delfgaauw & Dur
(2010), Besley & Ghatak (2005) show that motivation of workers is positively a¤ected by the extent
to which they agree with the mission being pursued by an organization.
Our main ndings stand in contrast with the e¢ ciency wage predictions proposed by the afore-
1The assumption of a random election mechanism is aimed at focusing our attention on the e¤ect of nancial
remuneration on self-selection. We hence disregard the role of political parties, voters, and electoral rules in a¤ecting
the quality of the elected politician. In doing so, like Besley (2004), we suppose that each individual knows her own
type but ignores the type of the others.
2Politics and the private sector are assumed to be mutually exclusive in our framework. This might be considered
as a restrictive hypothesis because in some countries members of parliament have the option to keep on working in the
market sector while in o¢ ce, for instance as lawyers, entrepreneurs or consultants. This practice is called moonlighting
and it is registered, among other seats of government, in the British House of Commons, in the German Bundestag,
in the Italian Parlamento, and in the European Parliament. A recent strand of empirical literature studies the impact
of this extra option on political selection (see Geys & Mause, 2013, for a survey of the literature on moonlighting
politicians). Accordingly, in Section 5 we allow for politiciansoutside employment and show under which conditions
our ndings are robust to this specication.
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mentioned literature on political selection. We demonstrate that increasing the politicians reward
does not have a monotonically positive impact on the expected value of welfare. The reason is
twofold. On the one hand, the opportunity costs of entering politics borne by the worst politician,
i.e., a market-t low-skilled individual, are relatively high due to her wrong t. On the other hand,
the top politician, i.e., a public-t high-skilled individual, incurs relatively low opportunity costs
due to her right t. Accordingly, the worst (best) politician does not demand the lowest (highest)
reservation wage. This means that the worst potential candidates are crowded out if a minimum
reward is set and that the best ones are attracted even if the reward is not maximum. As a corollary,
paying politicians much money attracts high-skilled individuals whose work motivation is yet market
oriented, hence poorly tted with the public sector. This adverse selection e¤ect is referred to as
moneycracy.3
Finally, we provide a descriptive overview of the European politicianslabor market, with a special
focus on Italy. The Italian case turns out to be interesting for our theoretical analysis. Italy is home
to the highest paid parliamentarians in Europe, whose real wage increased from almost 80,000 euros
in 1985 to around 140,000 in 2004. Over the same period, the evolution of high-skilled individuals
proportion in the Italian Parliament was consistent with the Italian populations positive trend.
On the contrary, the fraction of public-t parliamentarians decreased, contrary to what occurred in
the population. This suggests that the "moneycratic" mechanism of selection highlighted by our
theoretical framework may be in action in the Italian Parliament.
Overall, our analysis might contribute to the vivid debate on the politiciansremuneration that
is currently taking place in Italy. Given the severe crisis that has been hitting Italys economy since
2008, the common wisdom is that the parliamentary wage should be reduced for ethical reasons. In
their book "The Ruling Class, Management and Politics in Modern Italy", Boeri et al. (2010, p. 84)
suggest that the same recipe should be advocated also for e¢ ciency reasons:
"[...] We conclude that the sharp increase in the parliamentary wage in Italy has
contributed to the decline of the quality of the elected legislators over time."
Similarly, Pirani (2010) comments on the increasing presence of managers in the Lower house of
the Italian Parliament and seems to emphasize the existence of a moneycratic mechanism of political
selection:
"È probabile trattarsi di persone che perseguono gli interessi aziendali, attraverso
la loro posizione politica. Un conitto di interessi che assume dimensioni macroscopiche
3The more common terms "plutocracy" or "moneyocracy" are related to the concept of government by the rich,
with no explanation of why governors are rich. By contrast, we explicitly state that individuals get top income from
the private activity thanks to their high skills and market-t (they can be considered self-made persons), rather than
because their parents are rich. This makes a crucial di¤erence in our framework, since a rich heir with, e.g., high skills
and public t would raise no concern about selection. In the light of this, moneycracy could be dened as government
by the wannabe rich.
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quando verichiamo un dato senza precedenti: tra i parlamentari eletti alle ultime politiche
(2008) sono i manager a far la parte del leone (un deputato su quattro)."4
An analogous opinion can be found in Reggiani & Rizzolli (2012):
"[...] ci hanno illuso che pagando di più i politici avremmo ottenuto politici migliori.
Ci sembra invece che, o¤rendo alte remunerazioni e generosi privilegi, abbiamo attirato
in gran numero candidati che ambiscono ad essere eletti solo per poter accedere a questo
trattamento privilegiato e non perché motivati dalla missione di poter contribuire gen-
uinamente al bene comune in modo diretto ed attivo."5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we review the related literature.
In Section 2, we lay out the theoretical framework. In Section 3, we describe a benchmark model
where individuals are characterized only by skills. In Section 4, we solve the general model and
discuss the main results. In Section 5, we extend the analysis by introducing moonlighting. In
Section 6, we give an overview of the labor market of the European politicians. Finally, in Section
7, we draw some conclusions.
1 Related Literature
This paper explicitly introduces motivation into the political selection literature. Accordingly, our
contribution is closely connected, in the rst place, with the literature on work motivation. The
bottom line of economics papers dealing with such a topic is that motivation impacts positively
on the individuals productivity and/or utility. Some authors (see, e.g., Heyes, 2005) assume that
workers receive a non-pecuniary benet which increases with their level of motivation. Francois
(2000) focuses on the provision of social services and suppose that motivated workersutility also
depends on the level of output produced. Handy & Katz (1998) assume that, for any given level
of ability, the more motivated workers are able to produce higher output than their less motivated
colleagues. Similarly, Delfgaauw & Dur (2007) and Stowe (2009) suppose that motivation reduces
the workerse¤ort disutility, which is the approach we opt for in this paper.
Our framework is close to Delfgaauw & Dur (2010) and Dal Bó et al. (2013) who consider
individuals with di¤erent market ability and di¤erent public service motivation. Delfgaauw & Dur
(2010) study self-selection into public management. Yet their focus is not on potential adverse
selection e¤ects caused by high nancial remuneration. By contrast, that is precisely the research
4"These persons (the managers) are likely to exploit their political position to improve their private business. The
deriving conict of interest is huge as 25% of the deputies elected in 2008 are managers, the highest percentage since
the existence of the Italian Republic." English translation by the authors.
5"[...] we have been told that we would have attracted better politicians by paying them more. In contrast, it seems
that we attracted candidates who run for o¢ ce only to get money and benets rather than public-spirited candidates."
English translation by the authors.
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question of Dal Bó et al. (2013). They consider applicants for public sector positions in Mexico
and nd that higher wages attract more capable applicants as measured by their IQ and proclivity
towards public sector work. This stands in contrast to our ndings. The reason is that the authors
assume market ability of applicants to be increasing with their public service motivation. In our
paper we adopt a more general approach by not imposing any functional relation between the two
characteristics.
The second strand of literature which we contribute to is on political selection. The basic theoreti-
cal framework used to study the decision to enter politics is the citizen-candidate model. This strand,
inaugurated by the works of Besley & Coate (1997) and Osborne & Slivinski (1996), removes the
articial distinction between citizens and politicians by recognizing that public o¢ cials are selected
from those citizens who choose to become candidates. Our paper continues in this tradition.
The two aforementioned seminal papers assume candidates heterogeneity in preference. Our
article is instead closer to a second generation of citizen-candidate models, where agents are supposed
to di¤er with respect to their quality as a politician. Within this framework, Caselli & Morelli (2004)
and Messner & Polborn (2004) study how relative salaries in the political and private sectors a¤ect
the average ability of elected politicians. In particular, Caselli & Morelli (2004) present an adverse
selection model where the population is composed of high and low-ability individuals. High-ability
individuals are more productive both in the private sector and in the public sector. Similarly, in
Messner & Polborn (2004) the opportunity cost of serving in o¢ ce is higher for more productive
candidates. The main nding of both studies is that increasing the remuneration of elected politicians
enhances their average ability.
Comparable results are found by Besley (2004). He describes a political agency model with
two types of politicians. He considers the e¤ects of the politicianswage on both the behavior in
o¢ ce and the decision to run for o¢ ce. In accordance with the two aforementioned papers, Besley
(2004) demonstrates that an increase in wages raises voter welfare. Empirical support to this result
comes from Ferraz & Finan (2009). They study salaries of local legislators across Brazils municipal
governments and nd that higher wages improve the quality of legislators, as measured by education,
type of previous profession, and political experience in o¢ ce.6
Our model introduces an element of novelty within the citizen-candidate framework by allowing
for two dimensions of heterogeneity between agents: not only skills, but also motivation. By relying
on this richer formulation, we are able to di¤erentiate public sector productivity from market sector
productivity and to show that an increase in the politicianswage can be welfare-reducing.
Two articles in the citizen-candidate literature (Smart & Sturm, 2004, and Poutvaara & Takalo,
2007) describe circumstances under which raising wage can a¤ect welfare negatively. The main
mechanism behind this result is dynamic in Smart & Sturm (2004). Higher remuneration increases the
6A similar result is found by Gagliarducci & Nannicini (2013) who use data on Italian municipal governments from
1993 to 2001 and conclude that higher wage attracts more educated candidates.
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value of being re-elected. Accordingly, politicians are induced to implement policies that guarantee
re-election rather than policies aimed at increasing the voters welfare. Our comparable results
depend on selection rather than moral hazard problems. Poutvaara & Takalo (2007) present a model
of costly campaigning that produces informative but noisy signals of candidatesabilities. One of
their results is that increasing salaries may lower average candidate quality. This is mainly driven by
the presence of high campaigning costs, which are instead irrelevant and therefore disregarded in our
framework. As illustrated above, our mechanism relies instead on the selection of individuals with a
low degree of t with the public sector.
Interestingly, a bidimensional heterogeneity among agents can be found in the citizen-candidate
frameworks proposed by Mattozzi & Merlo (2008) and Beniers & Dur (2007). Mattozzi & Merlo
(2008) introduce a dynamic model where politicians display two dimensions of ability, namely political
skills and market ability. Whilst skills and t are independent in our framework, Mattozzi & Merlo
(2008) assume that better politicians are more likely to be better managers and viceversa. They nd
that high-ability citizens are willing to serve for a period (political careers), after which they might
leave parliament and capitalize on political experience. In line with the e¢ ciency wage theory, the
authors also show that better incumbent politicians are less likely to leave politics when the wage
level increases.
Beniers & Dur (2007) study the e¤ect of electoral competition on the behavior of politicians who
are heterogeneous in both competence and the extent to which they care about the public interest.
In their dynamic framework each incumbent o¢ cial, before the second-period election, acquires an
informational advantage over voters concerning the quality of the policies she has implemented. When
a policy turns out to be a failure, it can be reversed before the next elections. This action implies
higher welfare for the voters but a reputational loss for the incumbent. Consequently, only those
politicians who su¢ ciently care about the public interest are willing to admit a policy failure and take
the risk of losing the re-election. The authors show that politicians are less inclined to admit that
a policy has failed when they believe other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically.
Interestingly, the incentives to behave opportunistically increase with the politicianspay.
2 Setup
Consider a society with N individuals, N large. We introduce the following three-period citizen-
candidate model.
t = 0 The level of parameter w is publicly announced, w denoting direct remuneration plus any other
nancial benets from holding o¢ ce.
t = 1 N individuals decide whether to run for o¢ ce. Afterward, only one individual is elected
randomly among the candidates. Throughout the paper we refer to her as a politician and to
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individuals who are not elected or decide not to run for o¢ ce as a citizen.
t = 2 The politician exerts an e¤ort level e 2 [0;1) to provide a public good, the amount of which is
denoted by P (e), P 0 > 0 > P 00 and P 0 (1) = 0. If no individual run for o¢ ce, the public good
is not supplied. By contrast, each citizen gets income M (a), M 0 > 0 > M 00 and M 0 (1) = 0,
from a productive activity she runs in the market sector, where parameter a 2 [0;1) represents
the e¤ort level she provides when involved in such a task. Afterward, the politician receives the
reward w which is nanced through a lump-sum tax levied on all N members of the society.
Individuals are endowed with two characteristics chosen by Nature. Parameter i 2 fP ; Mg,
P 6= M , represents the degree of t or compatibility with the working environment, either the
public sector or the market one. Parameter j 2 fL; Hg, H > L, measures the level of skills.
Four types, denoted by ij = fM;Pg  fL;Hg, are thus present in the society. The proportion of
type-ij individuals is ij > 0, with
P
ij ij = 1. We introduce the following
Denition 1 An individual endowed with t parameter P is referred to as public-t. An individual
endowed with t parameter M is referred to as market-t.
Parameters i and j are assumed to a¤ect both type-ij politicians e¤ort disutility function, denoted
by
c (e; i; j) ; (1)
and the corresponding value of type-ij citizen, indicated by
s (a; i; j) : (2)
Functions (1) and (2) are increasing and convex in e and a: ce > 0, ce (0) = 0, cee > 0, sa > 0,
sa (0) = 0, and saa  0, subscripts e, a and ee, aa denoting rst and second derivatives, respectively.
We let
c (e; i; H)  c (e; i; L) ; (3)
s (a; i; H)  s (a; i; L) ; (4)
ce (e; i; H) < ce (e; i; L), and sa (a; i; H) < sa (a; i; L). Ceteris paribus, an individual with
higher skills incurs nonhigher disutility and less marginal disutility both in public and market sectors.
These hypotheses are standard. In addition, we make the following
Assumption 1 c (e; P ; j)  c (e; M ; j),
Assumption 2 s (a; P ; j)  s (a; M ; j).
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Assumption 1 states that, ceteris paribus, a public-t individual incurs nonhigher e¤ort disutility than
a market-t one when elected. Assumption 2 states that, ceteris paribus, a market-t individual incurs
less e¤ort disutility than a public-t one when working in the market sector. The two hypotheses
capture in a simple way the negative relation between person-environment t and e¤ort disutility.
Finally, we let the marginal e¤ort disutility in the public sector be nonhigher in case of public t,
ce (e; P ; j)  ce (e; M ; j) ; (5)
and that in the market sector be lower in case of market t,
sa (a; P ; j) > sa (a; M ; j) : (6)
Before proceeding, we remark that the politician receives a reward w independent of her type, i.e.
a at reward. This is a common assumption in the related literature. Besley (2004) points out that
"politicians tend to be regulated by career concerns rather than formal incentive contracts". Indeed,
it is problematic to link monetary incentives to key observable outcomes in the context of politics.
Moreover, politicians are charged with a wide variety of tasks which compete for their attention.
Accordingly, the remuneration system for them is generally supposed to be low-powered.7
With the aim of a better understanding of the role played by t in our framework, we rst study
a benchmark case where e¤ort disutility is a¤ected only by skills.
3 A Benchmark Model of E¢ ciency Wages in Politics
We simplify the set-up of Section 2 by supposing that t does not appear in the individualse¤ort
disutility functions. Accordingly just two types of individuals, low-skilled and high-skilled denoted
by j = fL;Hg, are present in the society. In addition, (1) and (2) rewrite as c (e; j) and s (a; j).
The model is solved backwards, starting from the third-period politicians choice of e¤ort while in
o¢ ce.
The Politician. When a type-j individual is elected her payo¤ function as a politician is
Uj  P (e)  c (e; j) + w   w
N
; (7)
where P (e) is the public good consumption linear utility, c (e; j) is the e¤ort disutility, w is the
reward, and, nally, wN represents the lump-sum tax.
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7For example, Mattozzi & Merlo (2008) and Messner & Polborn (2004) consider a xed salary. Caselli & Morelli
(2004), Poutvaara & Takalo (2007), Beniers & Dur (2007) and Besley (2004) introduce at private rents from holding
o¢ ce, which are dened as the utility value of both nancial and psychological rewards from public o¢ ce. At the best
of our knowledge, an exception is Gersbach (2003), who proposes a model where the politicianspay is made conditional
on the realization of macroeconomic events.
8Costs of running for o¢ ce are assumed to be zero. In the citizen-candidate literature positive costs are often
introduced which are equal across individuals. Following this approach would not a¤ect our results.
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At t = 2 type-j politician selects the e¤ort level ej to maximize payo¤ Uj . In symbols,
ej  argmaxe
h
P (e)  c (e; j) + w   w
N
i
: (8)
F.O.C. P 0 (e)  ce (e; j) = 0 is necessary and su¢ cient to nd a solution to problem (8). We let
Uj  P
 
ej
  c  ej ; j+ w   wN (9)
be the payo¤ obtained by a type-j politician after exerting the optimal e¤ort ej > 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem to F.O.C. yields @e=@ = ce= (P 00   cee), which is positive
by assumption. This implies that a politician with higher skills exerts more e¤ort,
eH > e

L: (10)
Citizens. We now turn to the citizensthird-period choice of e¤ort in the market sector. When a
type-j individual is not elected or does not run for o¢ ce, her payo¤ is
Zj M (a)  s (a; j) + P   w
N
, (11)
where: M (a) s (a; j) is the market activity income net of the e¤ort disutility; P is the public good
consumption linear utility, with P indicating the optimal level of public good provided by the elected
politician; nally, wN is the lump-sum tax.
At t = 2 a type-j citizen chooses the e¤ort level aj > 0 to maximize payo¤ Zj . F.O.C. is
M 0 (a)  sa (a; j) = 0. We denote by
Zj M
 
aj
  s  aj ; j+ P   wN (12)
the payo¤ obtained by a type-ij citizen after exerting the optimal e¤ort aj .
Individuals with higher skills exert higher e¤ort in the market sector. To prove it, we apply
the implicit function theorem to F.O.C. and get @a=@ = sa= (M 00   saa), which is positive by
assumption. As a result
aH > a

L: (13)
Politicians Reservation Reward. We now go backwards at t = 1, when all individuals choose
whether to run for o¢ ce. To study such a decision, we introduce the notion of type-j politicians
reservation reward, denoted by wj and dened as the minimum reward level a type j is willing to
accept to run for o¢ ce. Individuals are assumed to care just about money when making the entry
decision. This amounts to say that they compare reward w, obtained in case they are elected, to
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market incomeM (a), earned when they are not elected or do not run for o¢ ce. Instead, public good
consumption utility P and e¤ort disutilities c (:) and s (:) are neglected.9
Recalling that the election is random, we let p 2 (0; 1) be a candidate js probability of election.
Accordingly, a type-j individuals expected monetary payo¤ at t = 1 when she runs for o¢ ce is
p
 
w   wN

+(1  p)
h
M

aj

  wN
i
. With probability p she is elected and obtains the at reward net
of the lump-sum tax. With probability 1   p she is not elected and ends up with the net optimal
market income. On the contrary, M

aj

  wN is the net monetary return she gets when not running
for o¢ ce. By denition of reservation reward, wj must solve equality
p

w   w
N

+ (1  p)
h
M
 
aj
  w
N
i
=M
 
aj
  w
N
: (14)
As a straightforward result, wj is equal to type-j individualsmarket income, which represents their
monetary opportunity cost of becoming a politician. In symbols,
wj =M
 
aj

: (15)
Relying on (13) and recalling that M 0 (a) > 0 we can write
wH > wL; (16)
according to which a type-H agrees to accept a higher minimum reward than a type-L to run for
o¢ ce for she incurs higher opportunity costs.
Welfare. Before proceeding, we are interested in studying how the politicians skills a¤ect welfare of
the society. Adopting a utilitarian approach, we dene welfare as the sum of utilities of all individuals.
Utilitarian welfare when a type-j individual is in o¢ ce is denoted by Sj and amounts thus to
Sj  Uj + (jN   1)Zj +  jNZ j ; (17)
where j > 0 denotes the proportion of type-j individuals in the society, with
P
j j = 1, whilst
subscript  j = L;H expresses the citizenstype di¤erent from that of the politician. Accordingly,
jN   1 indicates the set of type-j citizens but the politician and  jN the citizens of the other
type. Plugging ej , a

j and a

 j into (17) and rearranging yields the optimal welfare when type-j is in
o¢ ce,
Sj = NP
 
ej
  c  ej ; j+ (jN   1) M  aj  s  aj ; j+  jN M  a j  s  a j ;  j : (18)
9This is a simplifying hypothesis aimed at disregarding strategic interaction among individuals at the entry stage.
It is in the spirit of Caselli & Morelli (2004) framework, where each individual candidate does not take into account
her potential inuence on the average level of the public good when she decides whether to run. If we relax such a
simplifying assumption, in line with Messner & Polborn (2004), the results of Proposition 1 are not a¤ected. The two
authors show that the expected quality of running candidates increases as the remuneration of the o¢ cial increases in a
setup where candidates consider both their direct remuneration and the possible improvement of the public good level
(if they rather than worse candidates serve) as the benets of running for o¢ ce.
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The rst two terms represent the public good consumption utility, enjoyed by all individuals, net of
the politicians e¤ort disutility. The last two terms denote the citizensmarket activity income net
of their e¤ort cost.
The optimal welfare is enhanced when a high-skilled instead of a low-skilled individual is in o¢ ce,
SH > S

L; (19)
provided that N is large. To prove this we build upon (18) to rewrite (19) as
P (eH)  P (eL) >
(ZH   ZL)  (UH   UL)
N   1 : (20)
The RHS of (20) is close to zero since N , which denotes the size of the entire society, is large. In this
case (20) is approximately equivalent to eH > e

L, which is fullled.
A trade-o¤ is at stake when comparing SH to S

L. The public sector benets from the presence
of a high-skilled instead of a low-skilled politician. The market sector is penalized by the presence
of a low-skilled instead of a high-skilled citizen. Yet, skills are more relevant in the public where
the benecial impact of a type-H individual is spread among all citizens. Put di¤erently, welfare
of the society is assumed to be positively a¤ected by quality of the elected o¢ cial, as measured by
skills. Even though identifying positive causality between quality of government and welfare is not
straightforward, recent empirical evidence conrms that political leaders play an important role in
enacting right policies, which a¤ect signicantly the economic performance: see, e.g., Jones & Olken
(2005); and Besley et al. (2010).
E¢ ciency Wages. The last step of our benchmark analysis studies whether and how the level of
remuneration w, publicly announced at t = 0, a¤ects welfare of the society. It is worth remarking that
w does not appear in the expression of optimal welfare (18) because w is transferred from citizens to
the politician. Yet, relying on inequality (16), we are able to show that w can a¤ect welfare through
the following selection mechanism.
1. If w < wL, no individual decides to run for o¢ ce since reward w does not satisfy the participa-
tion constraint of all individuals. In this case the level of public good is zero, no tax is levied
and therefore the welfare equals
S0  N
P
j j

M
 
aj
  s  aj ; j : (21)
2. If wL  w < wH , only type-L individuals run for o¢ ce. As a result, a type-L will be elected
with probability p = L=L = 1 and the deriving optimal welfare is EL (S)  SL, which we
assume to be higher than S0.10
10Note that inequality SL > S0 is equivalent to P (e

L) > fc (eL; L) + [M (aL)  s (aL; L)]g =N . In line with
condition (20), we assume that welfare is higher when a politician, even if low-skilled, is in o¢ ce than when nobody is
elected, because a positive level of public good is provided which is enjoyed by all citizens.
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3. If w  wH , all individuals run for o¢ ce. Since the election is random and L (1  L) is
the proportion of type-L (type-H) individuals in the society, the elected politician will be
type-L with probability p = L= (L + 1  L) = L and type-H with probability 1   p =
(1  L) = (L + 1  L) = 1   L. As a result, the expected optimal welfare, i.e., the welfare
before the election takes place, is EH (S)  LSL + (1  L)SH . It is easy to check that
EH (S) > EL (S) under condition (19).
We sum up our ndings in the following
Proposition 1 When only skills a¤ect the individualse¤ort disutility, the expected value of welfare
of the society is increasing in the politicians reward.
Conditions (16) and (19) ensure that both reservation reward and welfare are increasing in skills.
As a consequence, the e¢ ciency wage theory applies when just skills matter. Setting a relatively high
remuneration for politicians, w  wH , is the only way to attract good candidates and enhance the
expected value of welfare. This policy recommendation is in line with some early results concerning
the e¤ect of wages on political selection (Caselli & Morelli, 2004; Messner & Polborn, 2004; and
Besley, 2004). Yet, in the remainder of the paper we show that the prediction of Proposition 1 is
dramatically modied when the notion of t comes onto the stage.
4 The Importance of Motivation
In this section we solve backwards the model laid out in Section 2, where the individuals e¤ort
disutility depends on skills and t.
4.1 The Politician
When a type-ij individual is elected her payo¤ function as a politician at t = 2 is
Uij  P (e)  c (e; i; j) + w  
w
N
; (22)
where e¤ort disutility c (e; i; j) depends now on both the skill and the t parameters,  and . We
denote by
Uij  P
 
eij
  c  eij ; i; j+ w   wN (23)
the payo¤ obtained by type-ij politician after exerting the optimal e¤ort eij > 0.
We know from the above analysis that, for any given type of t, a politician with higher skills
exerts higher optimal e¤ort, eiH > e

iL. Similarly, condition (5) along with our assumptions on P (e)
and c (e; i; j) ensure that, for any given level of skills, a politician with public t exerts nonlower
optimal e¤ort, ePj  eMj .
13
4.2 Citizens
When a type-ij individual is not elected or does not run for o¢ ce, her payo¤ function as a citizen at
t = 2 is
Zij M (a)  s (a; i; j) + P  
w
N
. (24)
We recall that P is public good consumption utility, with P denoting the optimal level of public good
provided by the elected politician. We indicate by
Zij M
 
aij
  s  aij ; i; j+ P   wN (25)
the payo¤ obtained by a type-ij citizen when she exerts the optimal e¤ort aij > 0.
Relying on the above analysis we can demonstrate that, for any given type of t, a citizen
with higher skills exerts higher optimal e¤ort, aiH > a

iL. Similarly, condition (6) along with our
assumptions on M (a) and s (a; i; j) ensure that, for any given level of skills, a citizen with market
t exerts higher optimal e¤ort, aMj > a

Pj .
4.3 Politicians Reservation Reward
We now go backwards at t = 1, to study the individualschoice to run for o¢ ce. The key concept is
type-ij politicians reservation reward, denoted by wij . As shown in Section 3, wij equals the type-ij
individualsmarket income,
wij =M
 
aij

: (26)
The reservation reward increases with the market income, which represent type-ij individuals op-
portunity cost of becoming a politician.
It is worth studying how wij is a¤ected by t and skills. First notice that inequality
wPj < wMj (27)
is equivalent to M

aPj

< M

aMj

which holds true since aMj > a

Pj and M
0 (a) > 0. As a result,
for any given level of skills a politician with public t demands a lower reservation reward. The
reason is that she incurs lower opportunity costs of entering politics because of a wrong t with the
market sector. Similarly, inequality
wiH > wiL (28)
can be rewritten as M (aiH) > M (a

iL), which is fullled since a

iH > a

iL and M
0 (a) > 0. The
reservation reward increases thus with skills.
We study the ranking of reservation wages in the following
Lemma 1 (i) A public-t low-skilled politician requires the minimum reservation reward. (ii) A
market-t high-skilled politician demands the maximum reservation reward. In symbols,
wPL < wPH < wML < wMH i¤ a

PH < a

ML; (a)
wPL < wML < wPH < wMH i¤ a

PH > a

ML: (b)
(29)
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Public t a¤ects negatively the politicians reservation reward according to (27). By contrast,
skills have a positive impact given (28). As a result, a politician with public t and worse skills
(market t and better skills) requires the lowest (highest) reservation reward. In addition, a type-
PH politician demands a lower reservation reward than a type-ML i¤ M (aPH) < M (a

ML), or
equivalently aPH < a

ML, in which case she incurs lower opportunity costs of entering politics. When
the opposite occurs, aPH > a

ML, it is instead a type-ML who requires a lower reservation reward
than a type-PH.
4.4 Welfare
In this subsection we are interested in studying how t and skills of the politician a¤ects welfare of
the society. Following the approach of Section 3, utilitarian welfare when type-ij individual is in
o¢ ce is denoted by Sij and amounts to
Sij  Uij + (ijN   1)Zij +
P
fk fkNZfk: (30)
Recall that parameter ij > 0, with
P
ij ij = 1, denotes the proportion of type-ij individuals in
the society, whilst subscript fk 6= ij, f = P;M and k = H;L, expresses the three citizenstypes
that di¤er from politicians type. For instance, if ij = PH then fk = PL, ML, MH. Accordingly,
ijN 1 indicates the set of type-ij citizens but the politician and
P
fk fkN are all the other citizens
in the society. Plugging eij , a

ij and a

fk into (30) and rearranging yields the optimal welfare when a
type-ij is in o¢ ce
Sij = NP

eij

  c

eij ; i; j

+ (ijN   1)
h
M

aij

  s

aij ; i; j
i
+
P
fk fkN
h
M

afk

  s

afk; f ; k
i
:
(31)
We rst show that the optimal welfare is enhanced when, ceteris paribus, a public-t instead of
a market-t individual is in o¢ ce,
SPj > S

Mj : (32)
Indeed, inequality (32) can be rewritten as11
(N   1) P  ePj  P  eMj+  UPj   UMj > ZPj   ZMj : (33)
The LHS is positive. Indeed, ePj  eMj and P 0 > 0, and UPj > UMj by Assumption 1.12 The RHS
is instead negative because ZMj > Z

Pj is implied by Assumption 2. As a result, inequality (33) is
fullled. The reason is twofold. On one hand, a public-t instead of a market-t politician does not
decrease the level of public good, thus not deteriorating the payo¤ of all citizens, and increases her
own payo¤. On the other hand, the market sector benets from the presence of a market-t instead
of a public-t citizen.
11See Appendix A.1 for computations.
12See Appendix A.2 for computations.
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In line with condition (19), we can show that
SiH > S

iL (34)
is approximately equivalent to eiH > e

iL, which is fullled. The positive impact of a high-skilled
politician is spread among all citizens, thus outdoing the negative e¤ect in the market sector due to
the presence of a low-skilled citizen.
Taking into account (32) and (34), we are able to state the following
Lemma 2 (i) Welfare is maximum when a public-t high-skilled individual is in o¢ ce. (ii) Welfare
is minimum when a market-t low-skilled individual is in o¢ ce. In symbols,
SML < S

MH < S

PL < S

PH i¤ P (e

PL)  P (eMH) > (
ZPL ZMH) (UPL UMH)
N 1 ; (a)
SML < S

PL < S

MH < S

PH i¤ P (e

MH)  P (ePL) >  (
ZPL ZMH) (UPL UMH)
N 1 : (b)
(35)
Both public t and skills have a positive impact on welfare. Accordingly, welfare is maximum
(minimum) when the elected o¢ cial is type-PH (-ML). In addition, expressions
(Z

PL   ZMH)  (UPL   UMH)
N   1 (36)
are close to zero since N is large. Accordingly (35-a) is approximately equivalent to ePL > e

MH and
(35-b) to eMH > e

PL. Two conclusions can be drawn. (i) A type-PL producing a higher level of
public good than a type-MH,
ePL > e

MH ; (37)
is (almost) a necessary and su¢ cient condition for welfare to be higher when a public-t individual
instead of a market-t one is in o¢ ce for any level of skills. (ii) A type-MH producing a higher level
of public good than a type-PL
eMH > e

PL; (38)
is (almost) a necessary and su¢ cient condition for welfare to be higher when a high-skilled individual
instead of a low-skilled one is in o¢ ce for any type of t.
4.5 Ine¢ ciency Wages?
In this subsection we go backwards at t = 0 and study how the level of w a¤ects welfare through the
selection of candidates.
According to Lemmata 1 and 2, two alternative orderings of both the reservation reward and the
optimal welfare might arise. Four di¤erent combinations must then be taken into account, which we
sum up in Table 1.
We arrange the reservation rewards of Lemma 1 in ascending order,
w1  wPL, w2  min fwML; wPHg , w3  max fwML; wPHg , w4  wMH : (39)
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We also rewrite the optimal welfare in the following manner,
S1  SPL, S2  min fSML; SPHg , S3  max fSML; SPHg , S4  SMH ; (40)
so that Sn, n = 1; 2; 3; 4, denotes welfare of the society when the individual in o¢ ce demands the
n-th smallest reservation reward. By doing so, we are able to simplify the analysis of the reward
level e¤ects on the individualsself-selection choices and, in turn, on the optimal expected value of
welfare.
Reservation rewards/Welfare
Ranking (35-a):
SML < S

MH < S

PL < S

PH
Ranking (35-b):
SML < S

PL < S

MH < S

PH
Ranking (29-a):
wPL < wPH < wML < wMH
Scenario (i):
public-t enter rst
and enhance the welfare
Scenario (ii):
public-t enter rst;
high-skilled enhance
the welfare
Ranking (29-b):
wPL < wML < wPH < wMH
Scenario (iii):
low-skilled enter rst;
public-t enhance
the welfare
Scenario (iv):
low-skilled enter rst
and worsen the welfare
Table 1: Orderings of Reservation Rewards and Welfare
1. If w < w1, no individual decides to run for o¢ ce. The public good is not supplied, no tax is
levied and welfare is
S  NPij ij M  aij  s  aij ; ij : (41)
In line with the benchmark analysis (see Footnote 10), we let S be lower than SML, the welfare
level associated to the worst politician, type-ML according to Lemma 2.
2. If w1  w < w2, only type-1 individuals, i.e. those requiring the smallest reservation reward,
run for o¢ ce. As a result, a type-1 will be elected with probability p = 1=1 = 1, where 1 is
the proportion of type-1 individuals. The deriving optimal welfare is
E1 (S)  S1 : (42)
3. If w2  w < w3 type-1 and type-2 individuals run for o¢ ce. Given that the election is
random, the elected politician will be type-1 with probability p = 1= (1 + 2) and type-
2 with probability 1   p = 2= (1 + 2), where 1 (2) is the proportion of type-1 (type-2)
individuals in the society and 1+2 is the proportion of candidates. As a result, the expected
optimal welfare, i.e. welfare before the election takes place, is
E2 (S)  1
1 + 2
S1 +
2
1 + 2
S2 : (43)
17
4. If w3  w < w4 type-1, -2, and -3 individuals run for o¢ ce. The expected optimal welfare is
therefore
E3 (S)  1
1 + 2 + 3
S1 +
2
1 + 2 + 3
S2 +
3
1 + 2 + 3
S3 : (44)
5. Finally, if w  w4 all individuals run for o¢ ce. This means that the expected value of welfare
is
E4 (S)  1S1 + 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4 : (45)
First, in Appendix A.3 we verify that the expected value of welfare increases with the politicians
reward, En+1 (S) > En (S), i¤
Sn+1 > En (S) ; (46)
for any given n = 1; 2; 3. Taking into account that En (S) is a convex combination of values Sn, con-
dition (46) has an intuitive explanation. The expected value of welfare increases with the politicians
reward i¤ the welfare level attached to the new type entering as w rises, Sn+1, is higher than the
expected value of welfare before her entry, En (S). Obviously, the expected value of welfare decreases
with the politicians reward i¤
Sn+1 < En (S) : (47)
It is worth observing that the worst politician, type-ML, demands the third smallest reservation
reward in Scenarios (i) and (ii) and the second smallest in Scenarios (iii) and (iv). Taking into account
(39) and (40), this amounts to say that S3 represents the minimum welfare level in Scenarios (i) and
(ii) and S2 in Scenarios (iii) and (iv). By contrast, the best politician, type-PH, demands the second
smallest reservation reward in Scenarios (i) and (ii) and the third smallest in Scenarios (iii) and (iv).
This means that S2 is the maximum welfare level in Scenarios (i) and (ii) and S3 in Scenarios (iii)
and (iv). As a result, neither (46) nor (47) are fullled for any n, i.e., increasing the politicians
reward has not a monotonically positive impact on the expected value of welfare. Indeed, in the rst
two scenarios, S3 < E2 (S) and S2 > E1 (S). In the last two, S2 < E1 (S) and S3 > E2 (S).
The above nding, which stands in contrast to Proposition 1, is summed up in the following
Proposition 2 When both skills and t a¤ect the individualse¤ort disutility, the expected value of
welfare of the society uctuates in the politicians reward.
The reason for this result is twofold. On one hand, the opportunity costs of entering politics borne
by the worst politician, type-ML, are relatively high due to her market t. On the other hand, the
top politician, type-PH, incurs relatively low opportunity costs due to her public t. Accordingly,
the worst (best) politician does not demand the lowest (highest) reservation reward.13
13A similar result is found by Barigozzi & Turati (2012) in the case of the nursing labor market.
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In what follows we are interested in deriving the parametric conditions under which E4 (S), the
expected value of welfare when the politicians reward is at its highest, w  w4, is not maximum.
We study separately the four scenarios.
(i) In Scenario (i), the ordering of reservation rewards is given by (29-a) and that of welfare by
(35-a): see Table 1. Relying on (39) and (40) we can rewrite (35-a) as
S2 > S

1 > S

4 > S

3 : (48)
It is easy to check that E2 (S) is the maximum expected level of welfare. Indeed, inequality E2 (S) >
E1 (S) is implied by S2 > S1 ; E2 (S) > E3 (S) by min fS1 ; S2g > S3 ; and E2 (S) > E4 (S) by
min fS1 ; S2g > max fS3 ; S4g. Scenario (i) is characterized by two aspects. For any level of skills,
public-t politicians are cheaper than market-t and welfare is higher when a public-t individual,
rather than a market-t, is in o¢ ce. Setting a relatively low reward which attracts only public-t, w 2
[w2  wPH ; w3  wML), is hence welfare-maximizing. At lower rewards, w 2 [w1  wPL; w2  wPH),
only low-skilled individuals enter within the group of public-t. At higher rewards, w  w3  wML,
also market-t individuals are attracted but they worsen the welfare.
(ii) In Scenario (ii) for any level of skills public-t politicians are cheaper than market-t and
for any type of t welfare is higher when a high-skilled individual, instead of a low-skilled one, is in
o¢ ce. In symbols, rankings (29-a) and (35-b) are fullled. The latter ranking can be rewritten as
S2 > S

4 > S

1 > S

3 : (49)
E2 (S) > max fE1 (S) ; E3 (S)g is implied by min fS1 ; S2g > S3 . Yet, condition min fS1 ; S2g >
max fS3 ; S4g does not hold here. The sign of E2 (S)   E4 (S) is hence undecidable without further
investigation. According to (49), the ex-post rst-best situation here is to have a type-2 ( type-PH)
in o¢ ce. Any other type would generate a welfare loss. Inequality E2 (S) > E4 (S) can be reduced
to 
PL
PL + PH
  PL

(SPH   SPL) < ML (SPH   SML) + MH (SPH   SMH) : (50)
When setting a relatively low remuneration w 2 [w2  wPH ; w3  wML) instead of xing w  w4 
wMH , the society incurs the expected costs given by the LHS of (50). Paying less augments from
PL to PL= (PL + PH) the probability of electing a type-PL, who brings about the welfare loss
SPH   SPL. At the same time, the society avoids the expected costs denoted by the RHS of (50)
because it eliminates the probability of electing both a type-ML, who causes the welfare loss SPH  
SML, and a type-MH, who generate the loss S

PH   SMH . Therefore E4 (W ) is not the maximum
expected value of welfare if (50) is fullled. In turn this is likely to occur when the expected welfare
loss ML (SPH   SML) caused by type-ML is relatively high.
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(iii) In Scenario (iii) the ordering of reservation rewards is given by (29-b) and that of welfare by
(35-a). The welfare ranking can be rewritten as
S3 > S

1 > S

4 > S

2 : (51)
First notice that S2 < min fS1 ; S3g implies E2 (S) < min fE1 (S) ; E3 (S)g. In Appendix A.3 we
show that S1 > S4 impliesmax fE1 (S) ; E3 (S)g > E4 (S). Accordingly, E4 (S) is never the maximum
expected level of welfare. The intuition is simple. Relying on (39) and (40), S1 > S4 can be rewritten
as SPL > S

MH . In this case setting the maximum reward w  w4  wMH is welfare-reducing since
it attracts also high-skilled market-t individuals who give a worse contribution than public-t, both
high- and low-skilled.
(iv) Low-skilled politicians are cheaper than high-skilled but they give a worse contribution to
the society in Scenario (iv). In symbols, rankings (29-b) and (35-b) hold true, hence the welfare
ordering is
S3 > S

4 > S

1 > S

2 : (52)
The minimum expected value of welfare is E2 (S). Unlike in Scenario (iii), S1 is lower than S4 here
so we cannot rule out the situation where E4 (S) is maximum. Ranking (52) ensures that the ex-post
rst-best picture here is to have a type-3 ( type-PH) in o¢ ce. One can check that E1 (S) > E4 (S)
and E3 (S) > E4 (S) are equivalent to
(1  PL) (SPH   SPL) < ML (SPH   SML) + MH (SPH   SMH) (a)
and
PL
PL+ML+PH
  PL

(SPH   SPL) +

ML
PL+ML+PH
  ML

(SPH   SML) < MH (SPH   SMH) ; (b)
(53)
respectively. This scenario is similar to the benchmark case described by Proposition 1. Still, setting
the maximum reward w  wMH is not welfare-maximizing if (53) holds true. Note that, mutatis
mutandis, inequalities (53) can be read as (50). Focus rst on (53-a), which is likely to be fullled
when the expected welfare loss ML (SPH   SML) caused by type-ML is relatively high. In this case
E1 (S) > E4 (S) because setting the minimum reward w 2 [w1  wPL; w2  wML) has the virtue
of crowding out the worst candidates. Consider now (53-b), which is likely to hold true when the
two terms of the LHS are relatively low. This occurs in turn if fraction PH of the best potential
politicians is signicant with respect to PL and ML. Setting w 2 [w3  wPH ; w4  wMH) instead
of w  w4  wMH increases then the probability of electing a top politician and E3 (S) turns out to
be higher than E4 (S).
We sum up our ndings in the following
Proposition 3 (a) If for any level of skills the welfare is enhanced when a public-t politician rather
than a market-t one is in o¢ ce (SPL > S

MH), the expected value of welfare is not maximum when
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the politicians reward is maximum (w  wMH). (b) If for any type of t the welfare is enhanced
when a high-skilled politician rather than a low-skilled one is in o¢ ce (SMH > S

PL), the expected
value of welfare is not maximum when the politicians reward is maximum, provided that conditions
(50) or (53) are fullled.
Inequality SPL > S

MH is a su¢ cient condition for E4 (S) not to be maximum. Lemma 2 ensures
that SPL > S

MH is (almost) implied by e

PL > e

MH . The latter condition holds true when a
right t is more important than higher skills in enhancing the e¤ort level of the politician. In this
context, public-t individuals are better politicians. Setting a relatively low remuneration is welfare-
maximizing since it prevents market-t individuals from running for o¢ ce.
By contrast, inequality SMH > S

PL states that high-skilled individuals are better politicians.
Still E4 (S) might not be maximum since the politician requiring the maximum reservation reward,
type MH, is not the best politician due to her wrong t.
In line with the e¢ ciency wage theory, Proposition 1 asserts that as long as skills are the sole
determinant of individualse¤ort disutility expected value of welfare is maximum when the politicians
reward is maximum, i.e., w  wH . This is not likely to occur in our richer framework according
to Proposition 3, since the wrong t of the most expensive class of politicians, type-MH, makes
them relatively little productive. As mentioned in the introduction, this potential adverse selection
mechanism is referred to as moneycracy since people whose work motivation is well tted with the
market rather than the public sector are attracted to politics.
5 Extension: Moonlighting
With the aim of testing the robustness of our theoretical ndings, we enrich our analysis by introduc-
ing the moonlighting option. In other words, we relax the assumption that politics and the market
sector are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, a type-ij individual may work in the market sector while
in o¢ ce and get an extra-income m
h
M

aij

  s

aij ; i; j
i
, where m 2 (0; 1) measures the moon-
lighting activity. A regulated moonlighting is considered, i.e. m is assumed to be su¢ ciently low
so that the outside employment does not a¤ect a type-ij politicians e¤ort. Accordingly, the payo¤
obtained by a type-ij politician after exerting the optimal public e¤ort eij and market e¤ort a

ij is
given by
Umij  Uij +m

M
 
aij
  s  aij ; i; j : (54)
Her reservation reward reduces to
wmij = (1 m)wij (55)
because politics becomes more attractive. Finally, welfare increases to
Wmij =W

ij +m

M
 
aij
  s  aij ; i; j : (56)
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First notice that the positive e¤ect on welfare is small because it concerns only the politicians
payo¤. As a result Lemma 2 is approximately una¤ected by the moonlighting option. Second, it is
easy to check that Lemma 1 is una¤ected as long as m does not depend on the politicians type. We
can conclude that introducing the option of a regulated moonlighting activity for the politician does
not a¤ect our results.
6 Parliamentary Reward and Selection into the Italian Parliament
In this section we rely on di¤erent sources to provide a brief overview of the labour market of
politicians in Europe. Our aim is twofold. First, we compare the Italian legislatorspay to that of
their foreign colleagues. Second, we study the correlation, if any, between the evolution of such pay
over the last decades and the quality of individuals selected into the Italian Parliament.
Figure 1 illustrates the parliamentariansnet annual rewards in EU.14 The total amount is given
by the basic salary plus additional allowances and benets, such as per-diem reimbursements, the
level of which can di¤er across individuals according to seniority, di¤erent duties, and residence.15
Consequently, Figure 1 reports an average value of parliamentariansremuneration in 25 European
countries. It is interesting to observe that the top level is reached by the Italians.16
Average rewards of parliamentarians
1 Italy
144.084,36
6 UK
81.600,00
11 France
62.779,44
16 Portugal
41.387,64
21 Malta
15.768,00
2 Austria
106.583,40
7 Belgium
72.017,52
12 Finland
59.640,00
17 Spain
35.051,90
22 Lithuania
14.196,00
3 Netherlands
86.125,56
8 Denmark
69.264,00
13 Sweden
57.000,00
18 Slovakia
25.920,00
23 Latvia
12.900,00
4 Germany
84.108,00
9 Greece
68.575,00
14 Slovenia
50.400,00
19 Czech Rep
24.180,00
24 Hungary
9.132,00
5 Ireland
82.065,96
10 LUX
66.432,60
15 Cyprus
48.960,00
20 Estonia
23.064,00
25 Poland
7.369,70
Figure 1: Average wage of parliametarians in Europe
In order to compare di¤erent pays relying on the same typology of duties, Figure 2 contains a
list of rewards of the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) prior to July 2009 (Latza Nadeau,
2012).17 Again, Italian MEPs reward turns out to be the highest. It is, for instance, two times
14Corriere della Sera, 2005 June 9th.
15For instance, Stella & Rizzo (2007) report that the basic salary for Italian senators is 5,235 euros a month, but
on top of that they claim daily expenses, which on average amount to an extra 4,000 euros a month. When you factor
in the average phone bill - 340 euros a month - the real monthly income is nearer to 12,000 euros a month.
16The wage levels in Figure 1 are not based on the PPP. Giommoni & Scrutinio (2013) show that the di¤erence
between the Italian parliamentarians and their European colleagues is still signicant when the PPP is taken into
account.
17Starting in July 2009, the salary of MEPs is paid by the EU and pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judges
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Figure 2: MEPssalaries
that of the Germans and the British, three times that of the Portuguese, and four times that of the
Spanish.
Additional information is provided by Figure 3, which shows that the parliamentary rewards in
the European countries are generally commensurate with the standard of living, proxied by the GDP
per capita. Interestingly, the only exception is given by Italy, where the level of politicianspay is
much higher than the GDP per capita (Pelagatti, 2011).
Parliamentarians’wage
GDP per-capita
Figure 3: Parliamentariansreward and GDP per capita in Europe
On top of that, Italian legislators are allowed to keep their regular jobs outside Parliament.
Consequently, working in the Italian Parliament implies a substantial pecuniary gain for a large
majority of legislators. For example, in 2004 an Italian legislator earned an annual parliamentary
wage of 146,533 euros plus another 56,335 euros on average from additional sources. To have an
order of magnitude, the total amount was 1.8 times larger than the average earnings of an Italian
earning. This eliminated the substantial disparities among parliamentarians from di¤erent EU countries.
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manager (Merlo et al., 2009).
We also have a look at the evolution over time of Italian legislatorsremuneration (Boeri et al.,
2010). Figure 4 compares the real average annual income of Italian managers in the private sectors,
which increased by 69.2% between 1985 and 2004, with the real average annual income of Italian
legislators, which instead grew by 96.7%.18
Figure 4: Real average annual income 1985-2004, Italian legislators and managers,
2005 euros
Summing up, three interesting aspects concerning the Italian legislatorswage emerge from the
data. (i) It is the highest in Europe. (ii) It is higher than the average income of Italian managers.
(iii) Its real value increased signicantly over the last decades.
Let us go back to our theoretical setup, where the highest reservation wage is wMH according to
Lemma 1. When w goes beyond such a cut-o¤ - this was likely to occur in Italy over the last decades
according to the above evidence - high-skilled individuals with market-oriented work motivation are
predicted to enter the pool of candidates. In what follows, we rely on some descriptive statistics to
check whether a correlation exists between the rise in the Italian legislatorspay - from almost 80,000
euros in 1985 to around 140,000 in 2004, according to Figure 4 - and the types of individuals who
entered the Parliament since 1987.
Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of high-skilled individuals, dened as those with (at least)
tertiary education, in the Italian population (OECD Factbook, 2011-2012) and in the Italian parlia-
ment over the last decades.19 The trend concerning the Italian population (dotted line) is slightly
positive in the period 1998-2006, the initial value being 8.6% and the nal one 12.9%. Similarly, the
18Further evidence is given by the comparison between the Italian legislators and the US counterpart. In Italy, the
before-tax real annual parliamentary wage (in 2005 Euros) increased from 10,712 euros in 1948 to 137,691 euros in 2006,
an overall growth of 1,185.4%. In the US, the before-tax real annual congressional wage (in 2005 Dollars) increased
from 101,297 dollars in 1948 to 160,038 dollars in 2006, an overall growth of 58%. Interestingly, Italys real GDP per
capita grew by 449.5% over the same period, whilst the US one grew by 241.7% (Boeri et al., 2010).
19 Information on Italian parliamentarians derives from a unique database covering the period 1987-2006 (Legislatures
X to XV) and collected by Gagliarducci et al. (2010).
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proportion of high-skilled parliamentarians is not decreasing (upper solid line), from 63.97% in 1987
to 67.65% in 2006.
Figure 5: High-skilled citizens and parliamentarians in Italy (1987-2006)
Figure 6 illustrates instead the fraction of public-t individuals in the Italian population (World
Values Surveys) and in the Italian parliament. Public-t citizens are dened as those interested in
politics.20 Public-t parliamentarians are instead dened in two di¤erent ways. Individuals with
(i) both party a¢ liation and institutional appointments (e.g., major or counsellor of a municipality,
president or counselor of a region/province, member of the European parliament) before entering the
parliament; (ii) party a¢ liation but no institutional appointments before entering the parliament.21
Interestingly, the fraction of public-t individuals in the Italian population (solid line) is clearly
increasing, from 26.7% in 1981 to 37.4% in 2005, whilst that of parliamentarians is generally declining
under both denitions (dashed and dotted lines): from 36.34% in 1987 to 26.16% in 2006 for denition
(i); from 15.86% to 10.50% for denition (ii).
Obviously, the above descriptive evidence cannot be used to draw any convincing conclusion on
the role played by politicianswage on self-selection into politics. Still, it is evocative of the fact
that the Italian case is denitely peculiar and could represent an example of the ine¢ ciency wage
mechanism predicted by our theoretical framework. Indeed, Italy experienced an important rise of
the legislatorsreal wage. At the same time, the evolution of the proportion of high-skilled individuals
20More exactly, the questions analysed in the World Values Survey are: (i) Which of these statements comes nearest
to describing your interest in politics? a) Active interest; b) interest but inactive; c) not greater than other (interests);
d) not at all interested (sample 1981). (ii) How interested would you say you are in politics? a) Very interested; b)
somewhat interested; c) not very interested; d) not at all interested (samples 1991, 1999, 2005). We dene as public-t
individuals those who answered a) or b).
21For further details on the empirical denition of public t, see Fedele & Naticchioni (2013), who rely on the same
dataset as Gagliarducci et al. (2010) and analyze the e¤ect of person-environment t on choices of self-selection into
politics and e¤ort once in o¢ ce in presence of moonlighting.
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Figure 6: Public-fit citizens and parliamentarians in Italy (1981-2006)
in the Italian Parliament is consistent with the Italian populations trend; by contrast, the fraction
of public-t parliamentarians decreased, contrary to what occurred in the population.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated the decision to enter politics by individuals with both heterogeneous
skills and heterogeneous motivations. We rst considered a benchmark model where skills are the sole
determinant of individualse¤ort disutility. In this context, welfare increases with the politicians
wage since best (i.e., high-skilled) individuals are attracted to politics only if remuneration covers
their high opportunity costs. Our ndings are remarkably di¤erent when motivation is also taken into
account. We rst demonstrated that welfare uctuates with the politicianswage. We then derived
conditions under which welfare is not maximized when the politicianswage is relatively high. The
key aspect is that paying politicians more than wMH attracts people whose work motivation is well
tted with the market rather than the public sector. This adverse selection mechanism has been called
moneycracy. With the aim of testing the robustness of our theoretical ndings, we then enriched
our analysis by introducing moonlighting. Finally, we suggested that the Italian parliament can be
thought of as being representative of the moneycratic mechanism.
Overall, our analysis suggests that ignoring work motivation when studying choices of self-
selection into vocational labor markets, such as politics, might jeopardize the predictive power of
the theory.
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A Appendix
A.1 Inequality SPj > S

Mj
Taking into account (31) and letting
Pij  NP

eij

  c

eij ; i; j

;
Mij M

aij

  s

aij ; i; j

;
(57)
inequality SPj > S

Mj can be rewritten as
PPH + (PHN   1)MPH + PLNMPL + MHNMMH + MLNMML > (58)
PMH + (MHN   1)MMH + PHNMPH + PLNMPL + MLNMML;
when j = H and
PPL + (PLN   1)MPL + PHNMPH + MHNMMH + MLNMML > (59)
PML + (MLN   1)MML + PHNMPH + PLNMPL + MHNMMH ;
when j = L. Rearranging (58) gives
PPH  MPH > PMH  MMH : (60)
Rearranging (59) gives
PPL  MPL > PML  MML: (61)
Summing up, SPj > S

Mj can be rewritten as PPj  MPj > PMj  MMj which is equivalent to (33)
in the text after substituting (57).
A.2 Inequality UPj > U

Mj
UPj > U

Mj can be rewritten as
P
 
ePj
  c  ePj ; P ; j > P  eMj  c  eMj ; M ; j ; (62)
which holds true since
P
 
ePj
  c  ePj ; P ; j > P  eMj  c  eMj ; P ; j (63)
by denition of optimal e¤ort and strict concavity of P and
P
 
eMj
  c  eMj ; P ; j  P  eMj  c  eMj ; M ; j (64)
by Assumption 1. A similar reasoning can be invoked to show that ZMj > Z

Pj is implied by
Assumption 2.
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A.3 Ine¢ ciency Wages?
Condition (46). We study the following three inequalities.
(i) E1 (S) < E2 (S) is equivalent to
S1 <
1
1 + 2
S1 +

1  1
1 + 2

S2 , S1 < S2 , E1 (S) < S2 : (65)
(ii) E2 (S) < E3 (S) is equivalent to
1
1 + 2
S1 +

1  1
1 + 2

S2 <
1
1 + 2 + 3
S1 +
2
1 + 2 + 3
S2 +

1  1 + 2
1 + 2 + 3

S3 ,
1
1 + 2
  1
1 + 2 + 3

S1 +

1  1
1 + 2
  2
1 + 2 + 3

S2 <

1  1 + 2
1 + 2 + 3

S3 ,
1
1+2
  11+2+3
1  1+21+2+3
S1 +
1  11+2   21+2+3
1  1+21+2+3
S2 < S

3 ,
1
1 + 2
S1 +

1  1
1 + 2

S2 < S

3 , E2 (S) < S3 : (66)
(iii) E3 (S) < E4 (S),
1
1 + 2 + 3
S1 +
2
1 + 2 + 3
S2 +

1  1 + 2
1 + 2 + 3

S3 <
1S

1 + 2S

2 + 3S

3 + (1  1   2   3)S4 ,
1
1+2+3
  1
1  1   2   3S

1 +
2
1+2+3
  2
1  1   2   3S

2 +
1  1+21+2+3   3
1  1   2   3 S

3 < S

4 ,
1
1 + 2 + 3
S1 +
2
1 + 2 + 3
S2 +

1  1 + 2
1 + 2 + 3

S3 < S

4 , E3 (S) < S4 : (67)
Condition (46) in the text sums up the three above results.
Scenario (iii). E3 (S) can be rewritten as
E3 (S) = E1 (S) +

2 (S

2   S1) + 3 (S3   S1)
1 + 2 + 3

: (68)
E1 (S) > E3 (S) is thus equivalent to
2 (S

1   S2) > 3 (S3   S1) : (69)
E4 (S) can be rewritten as
E4 (S) = E1 (S) + [2 (S

2   S1) + 3 (S3   S1) + 4 (S4   S1)] ; (70)
E1 (S) > E4 (S) is thus equivalent to
2 (S

1   S2) + 4 (S1   S4) > 3 (S3   S1) : (71)
Since S1 > S4 , (69) implies (71) with the e¤ect that E1 (S) > E3 (S) implies E1 (S) > E4 (S). A
similar reasoning ensures that E3 (S) > E1 (S) implies E3 (S) > E4 (S).
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